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Jaime Ros and 
Gonzalo Rodríguez* 
This article reviews the development of the Mexican 
economy in general and the agricultural sector in 
particular from the Second World War to the 1982 
crisis. 
It underlines the important economic recovery 
of 1978-1981 which resulted from the oil boom, but 
points out that the increasing dependence on earn-
ings from oil exports increased the country's real and 
financial vulnerability. Furthermore, the investment 
needs for the development of this activity produced a 
marked bias in the use of resources. The result was a 
sharp deterioration in the non-oil trade balance and 
explosive growth of the external debt which, in con-
junction with the difficulties of the world economy, 
led to the economic crisis of 1982. 
Agriculture performed well in relative terms 
during the crisis, for despite growing at lower rates 
than in the past, it managed to isolate itself from the 
acute recession affecting the economy as a whole. In 
this it demonstrated great inelasticity to shifts in 
aggregate demand which meant that it grew faster 
than the rest of the economy in periods of recession 
and slower in periods of general expansion. When 
this moderate growth is examined in greater detail, ¡t 
is found to have originated in the performance of 
soybeans, wheat, rice and sorghum, which were the 
most dynamic crops, but this masks the sluggishness 
of maize and the large drop in beans, which are 
essentially peasant crops. 
•Economists. Consultants to the Joint ECLA/FA0 
Agriculture Division. 
I 
The situation up to 
the 1970s 
1. Overall economic development 
Since the Second World War Mexico's develop-
ment has been characterized by high annual 
growth rates (6% to 7%) in conjunction with 
exchange-rate stability and low inflation, close to 
the international levels. This situation was made 
possible by a framework of political and institu-
tional stability which allowed the successful 
implementation of development strategies 
based on imports substitution industry, sup-
ported in turn by industrial protection policies, 
financing from the State development banks, 
and fiscal incentives. 
The situation began to deteriorate in the 
1970s with the economic recession of 1971 and 
two-digit inflation which caused the progressive 
revaluation of the exchange rate. A new reces-
sion occurred in 1976-1977, together with an 
exchange crisis, as a result of the rapid deteriora-
tion in the trade balance and public finances and 
the increasing flight of capital. The economic 
situation forced the introduction, for the first 
time since 1954, of an orthodox stabilization and 
adjustment plan. 
The origin of the crisis lay in the decline in 
agricultural production since the mid-1970s and 
the rise in oil prices at a time when Mexico was a 
net importer. 
The slowdown in the industrial sector was 
caused by exhaustion of the imports substitution 
process, loss of competitiveness as a result of the 
revaluation of the real exchange rate, and the 
slower growth rate of world demand from the 
mid-1970s. 
The stagnation in agriculture, together with 
the sharp rise in international prices, accelerated 
the inflation and steadily reduced the positive 
balances of agricultural trade, one of the main 
domestic sources of financing of the external 
imbalances generated by the industrial 
development. 
Accordingly, the role formerly played by the 
agricultural sector was gradually transferred to 
external borrowing: in 1961-1965 the sector's 
trade balance surplus financed more than half of 
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the foreign trade deficit of industry, but in 1974 
it covered barely 3 % thereof. Conversely, exter-
nal resources, which covered barely 7% of the 
industrial trade deficit became the main source 
of financing in this period. 
The increased foreign borrowing for this 
purpose ended by causing an equivalent deficit in 
the balance of net income paid abroad. This rose 
from under 30% of the current account deficit in 
1960-1964 to over 50% in 1974-1977. The 
dynamics of the borrowing determined by the 
deficit encountered limits which appeared for 
the first time in acute form with the economic 
and exchange-rate crisis of 1976-1977. 
An oil-based economic recovery occurred in 
1978-1981. Oil production rose at a rate of 
19-4% a year and oil exports at 52.7% a year. 
The gross domestic product increased in turn by 
between 8% and 9% and the real national 
income between 9% and 10% a year. 
However, the abundance of oil resources was 
not used to lay the foundations for the sustained 
growth of the industrial and agricultural sectors 
for when the boom ended. On the contrary, the 
growing dependence on earnings from oil 
exports led to a considerable increase in the 
country's real and financial vulnerability. 
The investment needs of this activity caused 
a marked bias in the use of resources and higher 
demands. The result was a dramatic deteriora-
tion in the non-oil trade balance and explosive 
growth oí the foreign debt which, together with 
the increasing instability of the international 
economy, led to the economic crisis of 1982. 
2. The development of the agricultural sector 
The agricultural sector recorded high growth 
rates ( 5 % a year) between 1940 and 1965. This 
long period of expansion was driven forward by 
the agrarian reform, the large public invest-
ments in irrigation, the expansion of the culti-
vated area, and technological change (high-yield 
varieties, irrigation and fertilizers). 
There were big differences of growth rate by 
subsector and product, with a high correspon-
dence between the strength of consumption and 
production. The production structure adapted 
itself to the consumption pattern that emerged. 
The sector developed within an agrarian 
structure which was sharply polarized between a 
large peasant sector supplying a weak domestic 
market and a business sector supplying a very 
vigorous domestic market and the external 
market. 
Agricultural activities weakened from the 
mid-1960s (the growth rate fell to levels close to 
those of the population growth); at the same 
time there was a large increase in the relative 
importance of livestock and a decline in the 
importance of items of the basic consumer diet 
(and of cotton for external reasons). The drops 
were closely related to the reductions in the 
cultivated area. 
Peasants and businessmen behaved very dif-
ferently in their production decisions in the 
period after 1965; while the peasant showed 
great stability in the composition of their crops, 
with a firm attachment to maize and beans, the 
businessmen diversified their interests and pro-
duction decisions. This is part of the reason for 
the strength of the domestic supply of items such 
as sorghum, soybeans, safflower and livestock 
and for the concomitant weakening of basic 
products. 
These trends moved in close step with the 
long-term development of relative prices (which 
was affected by international trends and the type 
of interrelations which developed between the 
agricultural and industrial sectors) and with the 
different profit levels between and within each 
of these sectors. 
An economic recovery took place towards 
the end of the 1970s during the oil boom {it was 
also promoted in the agricultural sector by SAM 
{Sistema Alimentario Mexicano - Mexican Food 
System)). Not only was this recovery brief (espe-
cially in the agricultural sector) but it also com-
pletely disregarded a number of very acute 
problems and defects in Mexico's economic and 
social structure: 
— The concentration of income at one extreme 
and its effects on the other extreme reflected 
in poor diet, housing, services, etc. Much of 
the poverty and inequality clearly stemmed 
from rural backwardness and the duality and 
polarization of the agrarian structure; 
— The vulnerability of the production struc-
ture and foreign trade, which originated 
mainly in the non-oil sector. In the country-
side it also included increasing dependence 
on food imports; 
— The increasingly shaky finances, given dra-
matic illustration in the foreign debt. 
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II 
The adjustment policies 
The first reaction to the imbalances was to intro-
duce a number of adjustment policies which 
were frequently inconsistent with each other. As 
the situation became more difficult and aware-
ness of its seriousness increased, better defined 
and integrated sets of measures began to be 
formulated and implemented. The following 
stages can be distinguished: 
1. Chaotic adjustment 
This was carried out by the government of Presi-
dent López Portillo in early 1982 and was based 
on fiscal cutbacks, devaluation (80%), and 
higher public tariffs. A wage increase was agreed 
in April that year which ranged from 30% to 
20% and 10% depending on the level of earn-
ings. There was a further devaluation in August, 
a dual exchange-rate system was established, and 
payment of the debt was suspended for 90 days. 
The banks were nationalized in September and a 
comprehensive system of exchange controls was 
introduced. 
The situation was extremely complex in 
October and November, and the government 
decided to prepare and negotiate an adjustment 
programme with the International Monetary 
Fund. 
2. The 1983-1985 adjustment programme 
In this period the next government, of President 
de la Madrid, carried out the adjustment pro-
gramme, which envisaged two separate stages. 
Firstly, shock treatment to re-establish the main 
balances, followed by a so-called gradualist stage 
in which the product was to begin to grow. 
Briefly, these were the stages: 
a) The shock treatment (1983) 
This consisted basically of a drastic reduction 
of the fiscal deficit (which was roughly equal to 
50% of the gross domestic product) and an 
equally drastic cut in inflation (from 100% to 
55% in 1983), reductions of the current account 
deficit of the balance of payments (from about 
US$2 000 million), and suspension of growth in 
1983. These measures were accompanied by a 
very restrictive wages policy. 
b) The gradualist stage (1984-1985) 
It was thought that there ought to be a recov-
ery of economic growth (from 5% to 6% from 
1985 on) in accordance with a model of long-
term structural change which would lead to the 
expansion of non-oil exports and assign greater 
importance to the private sector and the market. 
3. Main features of the policies adopted 
The policies can be placed in the following order, 
in accordance with their purpose: 
To modify the price ratio of tradeable to 
non-tradeable goods: 
— Exchange-rate changes in 1982 and 1983; 
— Replacement of import taxes by tariffs. 
To reduce the fiscal deficit: 
— Increase of public tariffs; 
— Reduction of subsidies; 
— Two per cent increase in indirect taxes net of 
subsidies; 
— Rationalization of the public trade and pro-
duction apparatus, which led to the sale of 
236 small and medium-sized enterprises; 
— Drastic reduction of real salaries and wages 
in the public sector; 
— Cutback of 32% in public investment, espe-
cially by public enterprises; 
— Increase of public oil earnings via PEMEX as 
a result of the devaluation. 
To create a structure of factor prices to facili-
tate efficient allocation of resources: 
— Reduction of subsidies; 
— Increase of real interest rates; 
— Reduction of State intervention and greater 
participation by the private sector and 
market mechanisms. 
To stimulate the participation of the private 
sector: 
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— Fiscal incentives for private investment and 
high rates of accelerated depreciation. 
4. The effects of the measures 
The following were the effects of the main poli-
cies carried out in the period under study: 
a) Fiscal policy 
The fiscal deficit fell between 1982 and 1983 
to very close to the planned levels (from 17.9% 
to 8.5% of GDP). Where fiscal revenue was 
concerned, on the one hand the surpluses of 
public enterprises increased, but on the other 
hand tax revenue fell as a result of the inflation 
and delays in collection. 
b) Exchange-rate policy 
Between February and December 1982 there 
was a nominal devaluation of 450% in the free 
exchange race and 250% in the controlled 
exchange rate. In January 1983 the real con-
trolled exchange rate stood at almost half the 
January 1982 level and was almost 30% lower 
than in mid-1978. 
The dual exchange-rate system was intro-
duced in September 1982, and the black market 
at the United States border emerged in October-
November that year. 
December saw the introduction of daily 
minidevaluations, which were subsequently 
adjusted ¡n January 1983- It was hoped that this 
would produce rates of devaluation compatible 
with the targets for reduction of inflation. 
The management of exchange-rate policy 
was inconsistent owing to the conflict between 
the short-term and the long-term goals (control 
of inflation against structural changes) which 
was resolved in favour of the short-term goals in 
view of the improvement in the balance of pay-
ments, the better performance of non-oil 
exports and, too, the difficulty of regulating 
other key economic prices. 
Non-oil exports weakened again in the last 
quarter of 1984 and speculation increased in 
expectation of much higher inflation and deva-
luation than was planned. This attitude was 
based on the worsening of the balance of pay-
ments and the fall in oil prices. In March 1985 
the government increased the daily devaluation 
rates, but this measure proved insufficient to 
cope with the situation. 
That year saw a collapse of the exchange 
market. The official exchange rate was again 
devalued (20%), the free exchange rate was 
legalized and a new exchange-rate system was 
finally introduced. 
c) Wages policy 
This policy was the cornerstone of the stra-
tegy to control inflation and modify the structure 
of relative prices. Wages fell sharply as a result 
of its implementation. A tripartite commission 
of government, business and labour was used to 
adjust wages and alter the prices structure to the 
detriment of real wages. These measures 
resulted in a slower inflation rate and an ex post 
drop in real wages, with increase in the other 
relative prices. The severe wage cuts prevented 
the outbreak of galloping inflation which 
occurred in other countries of Latin America. 
The wages policy was relaxed a little in 1984, 
and the adjustments resumed their normal 
values. 
d) Foreign trade policy 
Import controls were reintroduced in 1981. 
This policy was continued in 1982 and part of 
1983, for the agreements with the IMF allowed 
temporary non-tariffs controls. 
Imports controls were eased slightly in 1984 
and the existing permits were replaced by tariffs 
of 15% to 20% of the value of the goods. 
The restrictions were reduced sharply in 
1985 and the tariff structure was rationalized in 
the direction of greater uniformity. A trade 
agreement was also signed with the United 
States which liberalized foreign purchases and 
eliminated exports subsidies. Tariffs were 
adjusted to offset the adverse effects, and official 
prices were set at levels higher than they should 
have been. Lastly, exporters were given an 
incentive in the form of import rights (DIMEX) 
which enabled them to import without prior 
permission and with a very low tariff of 10% as 
against a general level of at least 30%. 
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III 
The manifestations of the crisis and the adjustment policies 
1. Levels of activity, aggregate 
demand and total employment 
Total output fell 0.5% and 5.3% in 1982 and 
1983 respectively; public investment was cut by 
14.2% and 32.5%, while private investment fell 
even further. This was caused, on the one hand, 
by the contraction of the market and public 
investment and, on the other, by the drop in 
current and future profits caused by the higher 
prices of imported capital goods and the external 
business debt, which was in turn due to the drop 
in the real value of assets in the market owing to 
the massive flight of capital. This flight of capi-
tal was connected with the higher profits 
expected from external activities in comparison 
with domestic ones. The most seriously affected 
sectors were capital goods, construction and con-
sumer durables. 
There was a recovery in 1984 and 1985: the 
GDP grew at rates of 3.7% and 2.7% respec-
tively, industry at 4.8% and 5.8%, and private 
investment at 9% and 13%. Furthermore, non-
oil exports increased 18.4% in 1984 as a result of 
the economic recovery in the United States and 
the new agreement signed with that country. 
This phenomenon was due to the higher 
level of employment by the central government 
(despite the reduction of the fiscal deficit), the 
lower inflation, and the incentives for private 
investment (accelerated depreciation). Other 
factors were the medium-term effects of the 
1982-1983 devaluation and the short-term 
effects of the 1984-1985 revaluation. Private 
consumption slowed in 1982 and fell sharply in 
1983 (7.5%). This included a fall in the con-
sumption of durable goods but not of non-
durables, in particular foodstuffs, which were 
not affected at all. 
The increased exports were offset by 
imports growth of 197% in 1984. This growth 
came to a stop in 1985 as foreign exchange ran 
out. 
The 1984 recovery was characterized by 
industrial expansion concentrated in the auto-
mobile industry, which grew 26.6% in that year. 
This was because private businesses took advan-
tage of the investment incentives, i.e., the high 
rates of accelerated depreciation, to renew their 
fleets of vehicles. Private investment increased 
for the same reason. There was also a slow recov-
ery in industries with idle capacity such as 
cement and steel; a similar development took 
place in the basic foods industry. It can thus be 
seen that this was a strange economic recovery: 
growth in the automobile industry with a simul-
taneous reduction of investment in machinery, 
equipment and plant, especially in public 
enterprises. 
Agriculture performed well in relative 
terms, for despite lower growth rates than in the 
past, it managed to isolate itself from the severe 
recession affecting the economy as a whole. The 
total GDP rose at a rate of 0.1% between 1982 
and 1985, but agriculture and livestock expanded 
by 0.6% and 1.9% respectively, thus contribut-
ing to the adjustment. 
In this performance agriculture demon-
strated great inelasticity to variations in aggre-
gate demand, and this meant that it grew faster 
than the rest of the economy in periods of reces-
sion and slower in periods of general expansion. 
2. Foreign trade and the balance of payments 
The large devaluations and the economic con-
traction produced big changes in the external 
accounts: the current account of the balance of 
payments moved from a deficit of US$12 000 
million in 1981 to a surplus of over US$5 000 
million in 1983. This change was due mainly to 
imports (which fell 37.1 % in 1982 and a further 
41.7% in 1983), with capital goods falling by 
large amounts (42% in 1982 and 62% in 1983). 
Non-oil exports also contributed to the big rise 
in the exchange rate and the fall in home 
demand (they increased 16.7% in 1983). 
Nevertheless the adjustment proved short 
term, for following the recovery which began in 
1984 the current account surplus had already 
disappeared by 1985. This was due to two fac-
tors: the end of the boom in exports of manufac-
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tures towards the beginning of 1985 ; and the rise 
in imports during the brief recovery in 1984 and 
1985 (which owed much to the automobile 
industry with its high imported component). 
The farming sector made a moderate contri-
bution to the external adjustment, mostly in 
1984 and 1985, for output fell sharply in 1982 
and this was reflected in a large increase in 
imports in 1983 which subsequently declined 
and then disappeared in 1985. 
Farm exports rose by US$200 million 
between 1983 and 1984 and imports fell by about 
US$500 million, but this positive development 
was offset by the decline in livestock. 
The increased exports were due to the favou-
rable movements in the production and relative 
prices of cotton and tomatoes. Oil crops per-
formed well in the domestic market, together 
with other basic foods such as maize and wheat, 
and this helped to reduce imports. 
It is thought that the stagnation or decline of 
apparent consumption and the good output 
associated with good relative prices were the 
most important factors in agriculture's recovery. 
3. Inflation and food prices 
Inflation held a relatively stable rate in 1980 and 
1981 and there were no major changes in rela-
tive prices. It speeded up between 1982 and 
mid-1983 owing to the continual devaluations 
and the higher public tariffs and direct taxes. In 
the first two cases the adjustments were higher 
than past inflation, and this produced the ex post 
result of a higher inflation rate. 
The high inflation was checked to some 
extent in 1983 by a drastic reduction of wages. 
This was a stage in which relative prices shifted 
(real wages fell 20%, the real exchange rate was 
devalued by about 40%, and public tariffs rose by 
90% over 1981). As a result, the annual inflation 
rate of 25% to 30% rose to 100-120% in the 
first half of 1983. It fell 55-60% between mid-
1983 and the end of 1984 as a result of: unprece-
dented control of wages; mínídevaluations 
determined by the expected inflation rate; and 
less drastic increases in public tariffs. 
As a result of these measures the prices 
structure continued to change: between mid-
1983 and the end of 1984 wages fell a further 
13%, the real exchange rate was revalued from 
16% to 19%, and public tariffs rose 30%. 
A new phase began in 1985 with a new spurt 
in inflation caused by the wage rises and the 
further devaluations. This trend became more 
pronounced in 1986 owing to the sharp drop in 
oil earnings. The final outcome was an inflation 
rate of 115%. 
In short, the following happened between 
1981 and 1985: real wages fell 30%; the 
exchange rate was devalued by 30%; public 
tariffs increased 2.5 times; and there was a con-
siderable acceleration of inflation. 
During the crisis and the adjustment in 
1982-1985 food prices were not a source of infla-
tionary pressure. Despite the elimination of sub-
sidies and the modification of the structure of 
relative prices in favour of tradeable goods 
—which include some foodstuffs— the prices of 
agricultural products fell between 1982 and 1985 
in the middle of a period of large devaluations, 
and they improved, paradoxically, in 1984 in a 
period of revaluations. 
This apparent paradox came about as a 
result of the sharp fall in support prices in 1982 
and 1983 which prevented increases in relative 
consumer prices and at the same time reduced 
the subsidies for food marketing. There was thus 
a sizeable cut in the subsidy to the producer 
implicit in the difference between the domestic 
price and the external price; this had its greatest 
impact on basic grains (maize, wheat) and beans. 
The main focus of the elimination of the 
subsidies was therefore the reduction of the dif-
ference between internal and external prices, a 
mechanism which made an important contribu-
tion to the containment of the inflationary pres-
sures generated by the devaluations. Another 
factor was the reduction in 1982 of the external 
prices in foreign currency of many farm goods 
(this was repeated in 1985). 
This policy of low support prices could not 
be maintained indefinitely and k was changed in 
1984, with consequences for producer food pri-
ces and also therefore for consumer prices, 
which rose faster than inflation. 
Support prices were thus used in an anti-
cyclical policy to moderate the inflationary 
impact of the devaluations on the prices of trade-
able farm goods. Such a policy was possible in a 
context of growth in agricultural output, for this 
prevented inflationary pressures on the domes-
tic supply side. 
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4. Income distribution, standards of living 
and food consumption 
The main features of Mexican society are its 
inequality and poverty. According to the availa-
ble information, these features were more pro-
nounced after the adjustment. The following 
were the main changes: 
— Redistribution of wealth from the public 
sector —as it was a net debtor in foreign 
currency— to the external sector and the 
local private sector, for this latter sector had 
become a net creditor of the public sector 
through the intermediation of international 
banks. This was the reason for the increase 
of the external sector's share in GDP from 
3.5% to 8.3% between 1981 and 1984. 
— Transfer of resources from the private to the 
public sector since transfers abroad were 
made through the public sector as it was a 
net debtor. In 1983, the year of the main 
adjustments, the private sector's contribu-
tion to GDP fell more than five percentage 
points in relation to 1981. 
— Redistribution of wage incomes in favour of 
non-wage incomes within the private and 
personal sectors. Between 1981 and 1984 the 
contribution of wages to GDP fell by about 
10 percentage points to the lowest level 
since 1968. 
Living standards deteriorated considerably 
owing to the sharp drop in formal employment 
which led to an increase of 3.4% in informal 
employment. 
Peasant living standards were affected very 
differently by the adjustment. With good sup-
port prices in 1984 and 1985, for example, out-
1. Economic and farming policies up to 1981 
As a general rule, the traditional model of eco-
nomic policy tended to favour urban-industrial 
development through its policies on foreign 
trade, exchange rate and public spending, and to 
discriminate against agriculture, at least ¡n con-
stant terms. 
put was very high, suggesting an improvement 
in the property component in peasant family 
incomes. This is borne out by the large increase 
in maize production in the poorest peasant 
regions. 
In contrast, the wages component in peasant 
incomes was affected very adversely; it is esti-
mated that total farm wages fell by 32% between 
1982 and 1984. This sharp reduction was a result 
of the large drop ¡n average farm pay which was 
not made good by the slight increase in employ-
ment. This had a serious impact on a large 
number of poor peasants who depended mainly 
on their wage incomes. 
The crisis and the adjustment also affected 
food and nutritional standards. Nevertheless, 
the available information does not indicate a 
problem of food supply nor any clear deteriora-
tion in the average diet. There was however a 
large drop in the consumption of maize, beans, 
beef and milk between 1978-1981 and 1982-
1985. This was due to the fall in real incomes and 
was unconnected with output, which did not 
decline except in a few years owing to the 
weather, as we saw earlier. 
According to surveys carried out in March 
and June 1983, most of the families in the poor-
est population groups in the capital saw their 
consumption of all foods decline, with the excep-
tion of maize tortillas, and there was a clear 
substitution of animal proteins by vegetable. 
Another survey carried out between January 
and August 1985 produced similar results but 
with a lower percentage of families with lower 
food consumption. The sharp increase in the per 
capita cost of the minimum diet as a percentage 
of the minimum wage was one of the main 
causes of this situation. 
a) Foreign trade policy 
The effective protection was much less for 
agriculture and in some cases negative (although 
Mexico was not the most serious case among the 
majority of developing countries). The foreign 
trade policy pushed farm prices below interna-
tional prices (with exports quotas) and the sec-
IV 
The adjustment policies and the agricultural sector 
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tor's profits were cut by the relatively higher 
prices of inputs and industrial capital goods. 
b) Exchange-rate policy 
The revaluation of the exchange rate hurt 
agriculture by cutting the relative prices of its 
tradeable goods. This policy, together with 
industrial protection, accentuated the drop in 
farm profits by raising wages. 
c) Public expenditure policy 
Although considerable investment was 
made in irrigation infrastructure, most invest-
ment went into basic industries, urban infras-
tructure and external purchases for 
industrialization. 
In short, rural producers subsidized urban 
consumers and farm exporters subsidized indus-
trial importers of capital goods. But this situa-
tion was alleviated by specific compensatory 
policies. 
Most of the support for the agricultural sec-
tor was provided by two instruments. 
i) Support prices. This policy tended to push 
domestic prices above the international prices of 
the main imported goods but it had the opposite 
effect on certain export crops and on foodstuffs 
for the home market. But in general terms it did 
not sufficiently offset the effects of the overall 
economic policy: on average (25 products) 
domestic prices were lower than international 
prices in the 25 years between I960 and 1985. 
As part of this policy there was an important 
State presence in (internal and external) trade 
through the National Basic Commodity Corpo-
ration (CONASUPO). 
ii) Input subsidies. The most important of 
these subsidies were the financial ones (such as 
foreign credit and insurance) and the subsidies 
for physical inputs (fertilizers, seeds, water and 
fuel). The government's action was important in 
both cases, but the result was increased support 
for the business sector (except for the great 
importance of subsidized lending for maize in 
1973-1981). 
Overall economic policy tended to discrimi-
nate increasingly against agriculture in the 
1970s. However, the compensatory policies had 
the reverse bias of offsetting the previous effect, 
sometimes totally, with a high point in 1980 and 
1981 during the implementation of the Mexican 
Food System (SAM), which fully corrected the 
deterioration in its terms of trade which agricul-
ture had suffered since the 1960s, improving 
them almost to international levels. 
2. Economic and farming policies 
in 1982-1985 
The trends were reversed in this period (of 
adjustment): the anti-farming bias of overall 
economic policy was reduced (especially trade 
and exchange-rate policies) together with the 
compensatory role of the specific agricultural 
support policies. 
a) Foreign trade policy 
This policy changed with the liberalization 
of July 1985. There was extensive derestriction 
of imports for manufacturing and, indeed, of 
final goods competing with manufactures, but 
the liberalization was much less in the case of 
agriculture. 
b) Exchange-rate policy 
It was not to be that the enormous devalua-
tion of the real exchange rate should be passed 
on to the benefit of agriculture's relative prices, 
for economic policy was used to reduce the ratio 
of domestic to external prices (and moreover the 
relative international prices of the main pro-
ducts of Mexican agriculture fell between 1981 
and 1985). But this did not mean lower profits 
for the agricultural sector despite the worsening 
of its terms of trade in the period, because the 
large drop in real salaries offset that effect, and 
there was an increase in the proportion of oper-
ating surplus in agricultural output (although it 
is clear that this increase was limited to the 
agribusiness sector). 
c) Public spending policy 
The policy of reducing the public deficit and 
public spending had a greater impact on expen-
diture on the agricultural sector than on total 
public expenditure. The same is true of public 
investment in the sector in relation to the aver-
age decline in total public investment. This was 
certainly one of the reasons for the stagnation of 
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the area sown between 1981 and 1985 and for 
the slow growth of the irrigated area. 
The effects of the compensatory support 
policies were reversed at the same time. The 
most important change was the partial abandon-
ment of the SAM farming and food policies. 
d) Prices and marketing policies 
The ratio of internal to external prices wor-
sened considerably in 1982 and 1983 following 
the large devaluations, a deterioration deter-
mined by changes in support prices; the decline 
was reversed only partially in 1984 and 1985. 
This prices policy was used to contain inflation-
ary pressures, but it is probable that the effects 
were also due to underestimation of future infla-
tion. In any event, it altered the price ratios 
between crops: against peasant crops (maize and 
beans) and in favour of oil crops, cotton and 
sorghum in the first years after 1981; a relative 
price structure similar to that of 1980-1981 was 
restored towards 1985. 
The participation of CONASUPO in the mar-
keting of basic products was sharply reduced in 
the crisis period: in 1982 33 products were mar-
keted, but in 1986 only eight. 
e) Policies on credit and production subsidies 
The fiscal adjustment policy reduced subsi-
dies in general, including the financial ones. The 
subsidies for the farming sector depended on the 
level of the preferential rates and the volume of 
lending to the sector. Interest rates for farm 
credit increased steadily from 1982 in nominal 
terms, as did the ratio of interest rates to the 
average percentage cost of attracting the resour-
ces, to the point that the financial subsidy 
implicit in the difference between these two 
rates disappeared in early 1986. 
The volume of lending to the sector fell 
sharply in 1982 and 1983; it then recovered but 
by 1985 had not returned to the 1981 levels. The 
cutback was more severe than in the other pro-
duction sectors, and seasonal agriculture was hit 
hardest. The most seriously affected crops were 
maize, beans and rice; wheat, sorghum and oil 
crops suffered much less and recorded real 
increases in their borrowing from Banrural in 
1982-1985. 
Only approximate trends can be indicated in 
the case of input subsidies for agricultural pro-
duction: the overall index of the relative prices of 
these inputs showed a large rise between 1981 
and 1985 (changing the 1970-1981 trend) and 
this contributed to the worsening of the sector's 
terms of trade. But input prices in particular 
moved very differently: it seems clear that the 
adverse effects on the profitability of farm pro-
duction were concentrated in the most techno-
logically advanced segment. 
3. The global impact of the 
policies on agriculture 
Two periods must be distinguished in the devel-
opment of economic policy and its probable 
effects on agriculture. The impact of the real 
devaluations of the exchange rate in 1982-1983 
was offset by the prices policies and there were 
also sharp cuts in public investment and real 
lending to the sector, and the main adjustments 
were the main in the prices of agricultural 
inputs. The slippage in relative farm prices was 
partly corrected in 1984-1985, the volume of 
credit improved (especially from Banrural in 
1985) and public investment and expenditure 
were not subject to any further major reductions. 
What were the probable effects of these 
developments in economic policy? In the first 
two years of the adjustment, both in the produc-
tion slowdown in 1982 and in the recovery in 
1983, the decisive factor was the performance of 
seasonal peasant crops (maize and beans), which 
were hit hard by the weather. Sorghum and rice 
were also seriously affected in 1982. Wheat (one 
of the main irrigated crops) and export crops, in 
contrast, performed anticyclically. 
Farm output recovered with the good 
weather in 1984 and 1985, although it did not 
grow at the rates of 1983 or of 1980 and 1981. 
Wheat, soybeans, rice and sorghum (agribusi-
ness crops) performed very strongly in this 
period, while maize and beans played a smaller 
part in the recovery. 
The moderate growth of total farm output 
throughout the period 1982-1985 was due to the 
combined effect of the strength of the four crops 
mentioned above, the stagnation of maize and 
the decline of beans and export crops, except 
tomatoes. 
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The most dynamic output in the period thus 
belonged to agribusiness crops, profits from 
which were enhanced by the drop in real wages 
and, in the case of sorghum and rice, by the 
relative prices policy. The cutback in lending 
affected these crops less. Peasant crops did not 
benefit from the fall in real wages, and the 
effects of the devaluation were offset by the 
prices policy. In addition, they received very little 
financial support. Export crops (mainly agribus-
iness) were in an intermedíate position. The 
positive effects of the devaluation and the drop 
in real wages were partially offset by the domes-
tic prices policy or international price trends, 
depending on the case. The only exception was 
tomatoes, which clearly performed strongly in 
the period. 
What was the sum of these effects of eco-
nomic policy on agricultural output? It has 
already been pointed out that with respect to 
agriculture general economic policy moved, with 
the adjustment, into a transitional period charac-
terized by a weakening of the anti-farming bias 
of overall economic policy and by a reduction of 
the compensatory role of the specific support 
policies for agriculture. Up to the present the 
results of this transition (and with the sole possi-
ble exception of what happened in 1985) have 
been clearly negative for maize and beans pro-
duction, the peasant crops of greatest impor-
tance in total output and domestic food 
consumption; whereas the few "benefits" of the 
adjustment process —resulting from the drop in 
The agricultural sector showed an improvement 
in late 1985 with the recovery of lending to 
agriculture by commercial and development 
banks and the rise in relative prices which 
encouraged maize and beans production, for all 
of this had the effect of improving the terms of 
trade. 
Unlike other countries, in Mexico the struc-
ture of land ownership has not imposed restric-
real wages and its effect on profits— were heav-
ily concentrated in agribusiness producing 
wheat, oils and animal feeds. 
The good performance of total agricultural 
output compared with the rest of the economy 
during the adjustment period was therefore 
determined by its great inelasticity to changes in 
aggregate demand, a feature which distinguished 
it from most other production sectors and meant 
that agricultural growth should be compara-
tively high in periods of recession and relatively 
low in periods of general economic expansion. 
On the other hand, the changes in economic 
policy do not seem to have had positive effects 
on the recent performance of agriculture as a 
whole, for two reasons. Firstly, because the tran-
sition to a new model of economic policy was 
immediately preceded not by the traditional 
anti-farming scenario but nevertheless by a tra-
ditional scenario in which —owing to the pre-
dominance of the goals of food self-sufficiency— 
compensatory action and support for peasant 
agriculture perhaps reached their all-time highs 
in 1980 and 1981. The second reason was the 
priority given to the goals and methods of 
orthodox macroeconomic stabilization during 
the recent period. The subordination of support 
policies for the farming sector to those goals 
—exemplified in the management of the poli-
cies on price support, credit and public 
investment— had the result of offsetting the 
positive effect of the reduction of the anti-
farming bias in overall economic policy. 
tions on the sector's growth; the same is true of 
the potential usable area. The main problems lay 
elsewhere: for example, the limited introduction 
of technical inputs to increase output, for use of 
these inputs was concentrated in agribusiness. A 
new problem emerged with the economic crisis: 
the contraction of domestic demand which 
affected mainly industrial products. It is unlikely 
that any major change took place in export pro-
V 
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ducts, for the world market was determined by 
international prices and by the protectionist pol-
icies of the developed countries. 
In view of the concentration of wealth, the 
contraction of domestic demand as a result of the 
drop in real wages, the links between agriculture 
1. Prospects 
At the beginning of 1986 the Mexican economy 
was hit hard by the fall in the prices of oil, its 
main export product, which exacerbated the 
recession which had begun in the second half of 
1985. This development, combined with higher 
prices and public tariffs, lower subsidies and 
steady devaluation, led to faster inflation, to a 
level of about 100% as against the 60% of 1985. 
This situation imposed very difficult condi-
tions of recovery in the short term, for absorp-
tion of the impact of the oil crisis, in the absence 
of additional external financing or reduction of 
interest payments on the foreign debt, entailed 
very high economic and social costs. 
Studies of this situation show, according to 
various assumptions about economic policy, that 
the production capacity, the per capita product 
and real wages will reach in 1990 levels similar 
to those of 1985. With a low investment rate and 
rapid growth of the labour force, the unemploy-
ment rate will tend to rise for the rest of the 
decade. 
2. Contributions of agriculture 
to economic recovery 
The role which agriculture might play in overall 
economic development is in the generation of 
foreign exchange and increase of rural incomes, 
on the basis of the following assumptions and 
projections: 
— A cultivated area of 29-2 million ha by 1995, 
of which nine million are irrigated and 20.2 
million seasonal; 
and industry, and the consumption trends des-
cribed above, the conclusion is that agriculture 
will possibly grow below its potential in the 
future as a result of the greater increase of lives-
tock and therefore the increased use of farming 
land for livestock inputs. 
— Average annual improvement of 1.9% in 
per hectare yields; 
— Domestic consumption of farm products 
based on the following assumptions: 
a) The GDP and real national income grow 
at.an annual rate of 3% between 1986 
and 1990 and 4% between 1990 and 
1995; 
b) Population growth of 1.8% between 
1985 and 1990 and 1.6% between 1990 
and 1995; 
c) The elasticity of the per capita consump-
tion of farm products with respect to per 
capita income is 0.68 (average elasticity 
in the period 1966-1979); 
— Relative prices, both internal and external, 
of farm products remain constant at the 
1985 level. 
On these assumptions, a favourable farm 
trade balance of US$1 200 million at 1985 prices 
is projected for 1990 and almost double this 
amount for 1995. The growth rate of per capita 
rural incomes might be between 5% and 6% 
during the decade, improving the living stan-
dards of the rural population. 
Mention must be made of the important role 
that the agro-industrial sector can play in deter-
mining the standard of living of the rural sector, 
in improving the diet of the whole population 
and in easing the external restrictions, both 
through increased production and, above all, 
through the local integration of the agro-
industrial production chain. 
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